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Note: Application of the Pretrial Discovery Rules in

Minnesota-Some Constitutional Considerations
None of the new Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure
generates more disagreement between prosecutors and defense
counsel than the provision for prosecutorial discovery. It had
long been assumed that to compel an accused to disclose any
information tending to establish his guilt would violate his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 1 Recent pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court have substantially undermined that assumption, however, and have
formed the foundation for prosecutorial discovery in Minnesota.
Whether the Court's holdings are broad enough to support the
Minnesota rule is the subject of this Note.
The Minnesota rule implements a broader scope of prosecutorial discovery than does any other such rule currently in effect
and may serve as an experimental model for other states. Its constitutionality is thus a novel and important question. This Note
demonstrates that, although prosecutorial discovery may generally be, as the Supreme Court has said, a "salutary development
which ... enhances the fairness of the adversary system,"2 certain foreseeable applications of the new rule will violate the
defendant's fifth amendment privilege. Moreover, application
of one aspect of the rule will violate due process because it imposes no reciprocal obligation on the prosecution. The due
1. Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HAST. L. REv. 865, 899 (1968);

see, e.g., Lancanshire v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 218 Mich. 16, 20, 187 N.W.
319, 320 (1922) (pretrial discovery disallowed because "plaintiff cannot
be required to produce evidence tending to establish his guilt"). See
also Amendments to Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, 383 U.S.
1029, 1032 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 1091-92 (Douglas, J., dissenting); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Cs

an AL § 256

(Supp. 1971). See generally Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 279; Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 Duxm L.J.
477; Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor
Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 89 (1965); Traynor, Ground Lost
and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964); Wilder,

Prosecution Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,6
AM. CmiM. L.Q. 3 (1967); Note, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed
Rule 16, 85 HAav. L. Rn,. 994 (1972); Comment, The Self-Incrimination
Privilege: Barrier to Criminal Discovery?, 51 CA.LI. L. REv. 135 (1963);
Recent Cases, 76 Hnv. L. REv. 831, 838 (1963).

2. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1972).
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process problem can be obviated by simply amending the rule to
require equivalent disclosure by the prosecution. The fifth
amendment problem is more difficult to solve. It arises because
the rule permits the prosecution to use the information compelled from the defendant to prove its case-in-chief and to rebut
the defense regardless of whether the defense employs the
disclosed information at trial. On a case-by-case basis, the
problem lies in the difficulty of ascertaining whether the prosecution has used the information impermissibly. The Note concludes, therefore, by urging the courts to protect the fifth
amendment privilege by exercising vigilance in discerning improper prosecutorial uses of the compelled information or, failing that, by holding the rule unconstitutional.
The discussion is divided into three parts. The first briefly
sets forth the provisions of the rule and the extent to which it
departs from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 The
second evaluates its constitutionality. The third deals with possible solutions to the constitutional problems.
I. PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY IN MINNESOTA
The new Minnesota rule implementing prosecutorial discovery requires unprecedented pretrial disclosure by the defendant.4 First, he must disclose the names and addresses of persons
3. This Note does not undertake a thorough exposition of the pro-

visions of the new rule. A broad overview is sufficient to give the reader
an appreciation of the constitutional issues raised. For an analysis of
the relation of significant judicial decisions to the new rule, see MmnN.
R. C m. P. 9, Comment.
4. The prosecution still has access to the only means of discovery
that was available to it before the rule -was adopted: records of police
interrogation of the defendant and prospective witnesses. See Goldstein,
The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1191 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
Additional information may be available to the prosecution by virtue of
the state's ability to require the defendant to appear in a lineup, United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), speak, State v. Hedman, 291 Minn.
442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971), or give part of his hair, blood, or urine for
testing. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The state also enjoys tremendous investigatorial capabilities and scientific facilities. See
generally Goldstein, supra,at 1182-83; Note, Criminal Law-Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1640, :1642-43 (1965). Moreover, the
prosecution may employ the grand jury as a discovery device; it can
use a grand jury to obtain testimony from every person connected with
a crime. And a defendant cannot claim that a prosecutor has obtained
enough evidence for an indictment and is using the grand jury proces
for further discovery. See United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1971). Even after an indictment is returned, a grand jury may continue
to sit and gather evidence relevant to the crime charged, if its investi-
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whom he intends to call at trial. 5 Similar provisions appear in
the American Bar Association's proposed standards for pretrial
discovery6 and in the Supreme Court's Proposed Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.7 The congressional conference committee charged with finalizing the federal rules rejected this
provision, however, as well as one that would have required the
government to disclose the names of its witnesses before trial,
on the ground that such disclosures might lead to "[d] iscouragement of witnesses and improper contacts directed at influencing
their testimony."8 Apparently the committee determined that
gations are directed to another crime. United States v. Doe [Elsberg],
455 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1972).
Minnesota's alibi statute, linn. Laws 1935, ch. 194, § 3 (codified at
MnN. STAT. § 630.14 (1974)), which had required the defendant to disclose upon request "the county or municipality in which the defendant
claims to have been at the time of the commission of the alleged offense,"
was supplanted by the new rule. MINN. R. Canw. P. 9.02(1) (3) (c).
5. MnAfi. R. Cumw. P. 9.02(1) (3) (a). The defendant must also disclose any defense on which he intends to rely at trial See note 10 infra
and accompanying text. However, the defendant "is not required to indicate the witness he intends to use for each defense except in the case
of the defense of alibi." MuNw. R. Canv. P. 9, Comment.
6. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFoRE
TRIAL § 3.3 (Approved Draft, 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STAMNARDS].

7. Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(b)'(1) (c), 62 F.R.D. 271, 306 (1974).
8. H.R. REP. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Conference
Report). The committee concluded that to require the prosecution to
divulge the names of its witnesses before trial might jeopardize their
safety. Testimony before the House Subcommittee revealed that in 32
federal districts surveyed there were 713 "specific instances of assassinations, assaults, beatings, threats, attempts to bribe witnesses and to
suborn perjury." Hearings on Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6, at 105 (1975).
The immediate dangers of these practices are, obviously, unavailability
of the witness or alteration of his testimony. The long-term danger is
discouraging potential witnesses from cooperating with the police and
prosecution.
Likewise, it was thought that disclosure of defense witnesses might
result in their intimidation by the police. Id. at 162. For instance, the
police might ask defendant's alibi witness, "We have arrested X for burglary and he says you were with him that night-is that true?" Fearful of
being arrested as an accomplice, the alibi witness might lie and deny
being with the defendant. If he later changed his mind at trial and testified that he was with the defendant, his prior inconsistent statement
would be available to impeach him.
The proposal was also criticized on the ground that, though formally
reciprocal, it in fact favored the prosecution because few defense witnesses would refuse to talk to the police for fear of being implicated.
However, most government witnesses would be aware of and often exercise their right to refuse to discuss a case with a defense investigator.
See id. at 33.
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countervailing considerations, naraely, concern for the wellbeing and proper treatment of witnesses, outweighed whatever benefits might inhere in pretrial discovery of their names
and addresses. Accordingly, Congress chose not to provide for
such discovery in the federal rules.
Second, the new rule requires the defendant to disclose
written statements or written summaries of oral statements of
the persons whom he intends to call as witnesses at trial.9 This
provision has no counterpart in the ABA Standards or in either
the actual or proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
That the federal rules protect witnesses' pretrial statements is
not surprising, inasmuch as Congress refused even to permit
discovery of witnesses' names.
Third, the defendant must disclose any defense other than
not guilty that he intends to assert at trial. 10 This provision
was adopted, with reservations, in the ABA Standards." It has
no counterpart in the proposed federal rules, however, and accordingly was not adopted by Congress in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Fourth, the rule requires the defendant to permit the prosecution to inspect and reproduce documents, tangible objects, 12
and reports of examinations and tests' 3 made in connection with
the case that he intends to introduce at trial. Similar provisions were included in the ABA Standards' 4 and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Criminal Proceduce.' 5 The rule finally adopted by Congress, however, differs in one important respect from
the Minnesota rule. The latter grants the prosecution an inde9. MINN. R. Canw. P. 9.02(1) (3) (b).
10. Id. 9.02(1) (3) (a).
11. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 3.3. One "concern" of the ABA
Advisory Committee was in distinguishing between the specific defenses
that the standard would require the defendant to disclose, and a general
denial, which would not be subject to discovery. The Committee found
the distinction "difficult to articulate." Id. at 5.
12. Mfmx. R. CnmV. P. 9.02(1) (1).
13.

Id. 9.02(1) (2).

14. The Advisory Committee would have allowed the prosecution
to inspect and reproduce "any reports or... statements of experts, made
in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or
mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons."
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 3.2.
15. The proposed federal rule would have permitted the prosecution
to discover documents and tangible objects and reports of examinations
and tests that the defendant "intends to introduce as evidence in chief
at the trial." Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b) (1) (A), (B), 62 F.R.D.
271, 306 (1974).
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pendent right to discover this information, while the federal
rule allows prosecutorial discovery only if the defendant requests similar discovery from the prosecution. 16 Thus, under
the federal rule, the defense may prevent the prosecution from
discovering substantive features of the defendant's case by declining to participate in similar discovery.
In sum, then, the Minnesota rule permits prosecutorial discovery broader in several respects than that provided for in
either the Supreme Court's Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure or the final version of those rules enacted by Congress.
Whether as a result Minnesota has exceeded the limits of the
self-incrimination and due process clauses is the question addressed in the following sections.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
The new Minnesota rule providing for prosecutorial discovery is based on the premise that "the ends of justice will best be
served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties
the maximum possible amount of information with which to
prepare their cases."'1 Accordingly, the discovery provisions
were enacted "to give the defendant and prosecution as complete
discovery as is possible under constitutional limitations."' s
A. THE FIFTH AmENDmENT AD PROSECUTORIL DiscovEY
The principal constitutional objection to prosecutorial discovery is that it violates the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 9 The issue under the present
rule is whether the defendant, by being required to disclose his
defenses and to produce a list of witnesses, documents, and
items of physical evidence, is "compelled ... to be a witness

against himself."20 Unfortunately, the fifth amendment is not

16. FED. R.CRnm. P. 16(b) (1) (A), (B). The Senate version of the
rule would have given the Government an independent right to discovery

similar to that granted by the new Minnesota rule. The House version
made the Government's right dependent on the defendant's exercise of

its right. The conference committee accepted the House version without comment. S. REP. No. 336, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Conference
Report).
17. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1972).
18. INN.R. Cnmv. P. 9, Comments.
19. See Lancanshire v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 218 Mich. 16, 187 N.W.
319 (1922).
20. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
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gifted with "the guidance of a clear spoken text or meaningful

history," 21 and thus, "the law and the lawyers ..

. have never

made up their minds just what [the privilege] is supposed to do
or just whom it is intended to protect. '22 It is nonetheless
generally clear, as Justice Frankfurter suggested, that the fundamental "concern of the privilege is, as its name indicates, with
the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the
infliction of penalties affixed to criminal acts."28
During the 1960's the Supreme Court appeared in several
cases to be taking an expansive view of the fifth amendment.
For example, in Griffith v. California24 the Court concluded
that where a defendant declines to take the stand during trial
the prosecution cannot comment on his silence. Otherwise, the
Court reasoned, the defendant woul.d effectively be compelled to
take the stand rather than exercise his fifth amendment privilege. And in Miranda v. Arizona25 the Court made clear that
the privilege against self-incrimination "is fully applicable ...
[from the point at which the government begins] custodial interrogation."
21. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sm.
REv. 193, 195.
22. Kalven, Invokcing the Fifth Amendment: Some Legal and ImpracticalConsiderations,9 BuL. ATOm. ScI. 181, 182-83 (1953). Justice
Goldberg suggested some values served by the privilege in Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964:):
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important
advance in the development of our liberty-'one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."' . ..
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense
of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the iidividual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the enCT.

tire load" . . .; our respect for the inviolability of the human

personality and the right of each individual "to a private enclave

where he may lead a private life" . . . ; our distrust of self-

deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege,
while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection
to the innocent."
On the other hand, Chief Justice -Burger has stated that he is "no
longer sure that the Fifth Amendment concept, in its present form and
as presently applied and interpreted, has all the validity attributed to
it." I LE"Y, AGAINST THE LAw 18 (1975).
23. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956).
24. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
25. 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966).
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In other cases, however, the Court appears to have retreated to a literal reading of the self-incrimination clause. Thus, in
Schmerber v. California26 the Court concluded that, although
the defendant was in custody, the government could constitutionally extract blood samples from him against his will because
blood is "physical," not "testimonial," evidence and the amendment explicitly concerns testimony. The Court has also distinguished testimonial communications from other forms of physical evidence, such as handwriting, 27 voice exemplars, 28

and

physical characteristics, consistently holding that the privilege

applies only to the former. 29 In Couch v. United States30 the

Court determined that the evidence must not only be testimonial,
it must be "personal" to the party seeking to raise the privilege.
Thus, the government could constitutionally require the defendant's accountant to disclose a report he had prepared concerning
defendant's taxes. In Williams v. Florida l the Court concluded
that a rule requiring the defendant to notify the prosecution of
his intention to raise an alibi defense was constitutional, on the
theory that the choice to raise the defense remained with the
defendant-he was not "compelled" to reveal anything at all. And
Justice White, concurring in Maness v. Meyers,3 2 emphasized
that the fifth amendment is concerned with "incrimination," stating:
The purpose of the relevant part of the Fifth Amendment is to
prevent compelled self-incrimination, not to protect private information. Testimony demanded of a witness may be very pri26. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
27. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
28. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
29. E.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (driver can be constitutionally required to stop and identify himself after an automobile accident); see Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 103, 126.
30. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
31. 399 U.S. 78 (1969).
32. 419 U.S. 449, 473-74 (1975) (White, J., concurring). On the
other hand, the Court has recognized that "[t]he privilege against
self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of
incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). Accordingly, "[to sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result."
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). The privilege
embraces every answer "which would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute." Id. at 486, quoted in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
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vate indeed, but unless it is incriminating and protected by the
Amendment ... it must be disclosed.

These cases indicate that the Court would evaluate the constitutionality of the Minnesota discovery provisions by asking
whether they compel the defendamt in a particular case to disclose incriminating, testimonial information personal to the defendant. Apparently, unless application of the rule would violate
all of these conditions, as defined by the Court, it will not in
the particular case run afoul of the fifth amendment privilege.
1.

PrivateCommunications

Advocates of prosecutorial discovery argue that documents,
tangible objects, examination reports, tests, and witnesses'
recorded statements do not reflect personal communications of
the defendant.3 3 Therefore, they assert, these items are not testimonial in a constitutional sense and are not protected by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. Support for this position
may be found in Couch v. United States,3 4 where the Court held
that information possessed by third parties is not protected, and
in the line of cases in which the Court distinguished "physical"
from "testimonial" evidence.3 5 More recently, however, the
Court confronted this problem in United States v. Nobles36
and appeared to be willing to protect certain "third party"
reports. In Nobles, a district court had refused to allow defendant to introduce testimony by his investigator that would have
impeached prosecution witnesses with prior inconsistent statements, unless the defense would disclose the relevant portions
of the investigator's report so that the investigator could be
cross-examined thereon. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating
that "the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, being
personal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or
statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial" and
holding that disclosure of the investigator's report would not
violate the fifth amendment.3 7 The Court was careful to note,
however, that "[defendant] did not prepare the report and there
33. See Allyn, Pretial Discovery in Minnesota, 60 MINN. L. REv.
725 (1976).
34. 399 U.S. 78 (1969).
35. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
36. 422 U.S. 223 (1975).

37. Id. at 234. The Court also held that the attorney work-product
doctrine was not available to prevent disclosure of the investigative report because the defendant had waived the privilege by electing to present the investigator as a witness. Id. at 239.
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is no suggestion that the portions subject to the disclosure order
3 8 Of
reflected any information he conveyed to the investigator."
course, if a report is prepared by the defendant, it reflects his
"personal communications." So does it also, as the dictum in
Nobles suggests, if the report is compiled of information from
the defendant to the investigator.
This statement strongly suggests that Nobles imposes a limitation that the Minnesota rule fails to recognize. Since the Mn-

nesota rule providing for discovery of documents and reports
fails to distinguish between those made or prepared solely by
third parties and those prepared with the assistance of or participation by the accused, certain applications of the rule would appear, in light of Nobles, to violate the fifth amendment where

the disclosure was "compelled" and "incriminating" in the constitutional sense.
2.

Self-Incriminationr

It also has been argued that the information discoverable
under the rule is not incriminating, because the prosecution is
entitled only to that which defendant intends to introduce at
trial. This argument ignores the fact that the rule requires the
defendant to determine whether evidence is incriminating before
he observes the prosecution's case-in-chief. There is great potential for error in that premature determination. Of course, the
potential is reduced as the defendant becomes better informed
about the prosecution's case. Certainly, where the facts of the
case are clear and the defendant has the benefit of pretrial disclosure, 39 he can make an educated decision whether his evidence
is incriminating. In many cases, however, the evidentiary issues
will be sufficiently clouded to render the defendant's pretrial decision mere guesswork. In these situations, evidence that appears
to be exculpatory before trial may later prove inculpatory. Thus
it is not true as a general proposition that simply because the
rule requires disclosure only of information that the defendant
intends to reveal at trial, it necessarily does not violate the fifth
40
amendment privilege.
38. Id. at 234.
39. The defendant's rights to pretrial discovery under the new MAinnesota rules are equal to or greater than the discovery rights of the prosecution except in that the prosecution can withhold the names and addresses of its prospective witnesses if it certifies that disclosure might
subject them to physical harm or coercion. mm. R. Cnm . P. 9.01-.02. It
is argued that this exception violates due process. See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
40. Indeed, it may be argued that requiring defense counsel to de-
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3. Compulsion
Finally, because the rule requires the defendant to disclose
only information that he intends to introduce at trial, proponents
argue that it does not "compel" disclosure and thus does not
violate the fifth amendment privilege. Similar reasoning un4
derlies the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida. '
There the Court upheld the Florida notice-of-alibi statute
against the argument that it compelled disclosure and thus violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court reasoned:
At most the rule only compelled petitioner to accelerate the
timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date
information that petitioner from the beginning planned to
divulge at trial. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege
entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await
the end of the State's case before announcing the nature of his
defense, any more than it entitles him to await the jury's verdict
on the State's case-in-chief
before deciding whether or not to
take the stand himself. 42
The Court emphasized that absent the notice-of-alibi rule, it
would have been constitutionally permissible for the district
court to grant the state a continuance on the ground of surprise
as soon as the alibi witness was called. 43 By providing for
pretrial discovery, the state was merely accomplishing the purpose served by a continuance while avoiding its disruptive effect
on the trial.
The foundation of the Court's acceleration-of-timing rationale in Williams is that the defendant is not compelled to disclose
information when he intends to introduce it at trial. The defendant is in "precisely the same position ... as he would be if
cide whether to disclose potentially incriminating information before
she has an adequate opportunity to evaluate the prosecution's case
at trial violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective counsel Although the traditional standard to determine whether counsel has
been ineffective is whether counsel's inadequacy has turned a trial into
a "farce or mockery," see Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 69296 (6th Cir. 1974), it is submitted that this standard is inapplicable in
determining whether a state's procedural rules may render counsel's
services ineffective before trial. Rather, the standard in this situation
should be whether the procedural rule inhibits counsel's decision-making
process so as to render later assistance ineffective. Applied to those cases
where defendant's pretrial decision to disclose information is mere guesswork, the Minnesota discovery rule might violate this standard.
41. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
42. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 85-86.
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he remained silent [until trial],"' 44 losing only "the right to
surprise the State with an alibi defense.

'45

However, two uses

by the prosecution of information obtained by pretrial discovery
under the new rule may violate the defendant's fifth amendment privilege regardless of the fact that he intended to use the
disclosed information at trial.
a. Prosecution's case-in-chief
The prosecution traditionally had no opportunity for formal
discovery, and inasmuch as its case-in-chief always preceded the
defense, it could not prove that case with evidence introduced
by the defense. Information in the hands of the defendant was
available to the state only for cross-examination and rebuttal.
The effect of the new rule is to allow the prosecution to use
the results of discovery to prove its case-in-chief. 46 The rule
thus affects a fundamental change in the criminal justice system
in Minnesota. Although Williams might be read to support so
sweeping a change, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court meant
in that case to announce the broad proposition that the states
may constitutionally extract from the accused any evidence he
intends to introduce at trial. Had the Court meant Williams to
sanction such discovery, any statements the accused himself intended to offer at trial would be fair game. Thus it is crucial to
recognize that in Williams it was unlikely that the prosecution
could have used in its case-in-chief the knowledge of defendant's
alibi that it gained by discovery, because in relying on an alibi
at trial the defendant contended that he was not at the scene of
the crime when the crime occurred. The only possible assistance that the prosecution could have derived from pretrial discovery of the alibi was in cross-examination of the alibi witness
or in rebuttal of the alibi claim. Thus, the Court did not con44. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 468 (1972) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
45. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
46. For instance, by disclosing the name of an eyewitness before
trial and notifying the prosecution that he intends to plead self-defense,
the defendant admits the forbidden act. The state can use the eyewitness
to establish that the defendant is guilty of murder. See Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HAv. L. REV. 994, 1004
(1972). This situation creates an incentive for prosecutorial abuse. Without enough evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the prosecution, rather than dropping the matter, may demand discovery
from the defendant and thereby obtain sufficient information to prove
its case-in-chief.
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front and Williams should not be xead to sanction prosecutorial
use of discovered information to prove its case-in-chief.
b. Prosecution's rebuttal
Again, before adoption of the new rule, the prosecution's
only access to the defendant's case was the evidence that the
defendant introduced at trial. The state could use this evidence to uncover new leads during the course of trial in
order to develop its case in rebuttal. Under the new rule, the
defendant is required to disclose before trial evidence that he
intends to introduce at trial. The purpose of this discovery is to
enable the prosecution to more effectively counter the evidence
at trial. If, however, the defendant changes his mind after
disclosure and chooses not to introduce the evidence at trial, the
prosecution may nonetheless use it to rebut the defendant's case
as well as to prove its case-in-chief.
As indicated above, this result is inconsistent with the
Williams acceleration-of-timing rationale. Moreover, it serves to
demonstrate a flaw in the Court's reasoning in that case. To
the majority in Williams, the defendant's decision whether to introduce particular evidence at trial is influenced by the same
factors regardless of whether it is made before trial or during
trial.4 7 However, "[a]ny lawyer who has actually tried a case
knows that, regardless of the amount of pretrial preparation, a
case looks far different when it is actually being tried than when
it is only being thought about. 48 _herefore, the pretrial choice
required of defendant under prosecutorial discovery is "a vastly
different decision from that faced by one who can wait until the
State has presented the case against him before making up his
49
mind."
To illustrate the points raised with regard to whether the
new rule compels disclosure within the constitutional meaning
of that term, assume that a defendant is required to disclose potentially incriminating information before trial. If the prosecution employs that information in its case-in-chief, the defendant's
subsequent choice not to introduce the information is bereft of
content. Alternatively, assume that he prosecution chooses not to
employ the information in its case-in-chief, and the defendant
chooses not to introduce it on his own behalf. If the prosecu47. 399 U.S. at 85.
48. Id. at 109 (Black, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
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tion were then permitted to enhance its rebuttal with the disclosed information or evidence derived therefrom, the defendant's earlier choice not to introduce it would be meaningless. 50
Inasmuch as the Minnesota rule fails to preclude the prosecution from employing disclosed information in its case-in-chief
and in rebuttal even when the defendant chooses not to introduce
the information on his own behalf, it goes beyond Williams. Although the Court has not addressed the precise issue raised by
the Minnesota rule, there is ample ground for concluding that
the disclosure that the rule requires is compelled.

B.

DuE PROCESS AND RECIPROCITY

The due process clause also imposes limitations upon prosecutorial discovery. In Wardius v. Oregon,5 1 the Supreme Court
held Oregon's notice-of-alibi statute violative of due process because it did not require the state to reveal to the defendant the
names and addresses of witnesses it planned to use to refute the
alibi defense. The Court stated:
[I]n the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The State may not
insist that trials be run as "a search for truth" so far as defense
maintaining "poker game" sewitnesses are concerned, while
52
crecy for its own witnesses.

The Court also noted that "the State's inherent informationgathering advantages suggest that if there is to be any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in the defendant's
53
favor."
50. Defendant's position at trial is also weakened substantially under the new rule in that the prosecution, in addition to using the discovered information in its case-in-chief, may derive indirect benefits from
the information. These include focusing the investigation, evaluating
other evidence, and planning trial strategy.
51. 41ZU.S. 470 (1973).
52. Id. at 475.

53. Id. n.9.

Besides greater financial and staff resources with which to
investigate and scientifically analyze evidence, the prosecutor
has a number of tactical advantages. First, he begins his investigation shortly after the crime has been committed when
physical evidence is more likely to be found and when witnesses
are more apt to remember events. Only after the prosecutor has
gathered sufficient evidence is the defendant informed of the
charges against him; by the time the defendant or his attorney
begins any investigation into the facts of the case, the trail is
not only cold, but a diligent prosecutor will have removed much
of the evidence from the field. In addition to the advantage of
timing, the prosecutor may compel people, including the defendant, to cooperate. The defendant may be questioned within lim-
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The Minnesota rule lacks the reciprocity required by Wardius in that it grants the prosecution the right to certify that,
pretrial disclosure of the names of its witnesses might subject
the witness to physical harm or coercion 5 4 but requires the
defendant to show cause in order to obtain similar protection
from the trial court.55 No limitations are imposed on the prosecution's right to certify. It may do so on the slightest suspicion,58 or on none. Thus it is likely that in some cases the state
will withhold the names of one or all of its witnesses while the
defendant will be required to comply with all discovery provisions. In Wardius, the Court stated that "[i]t is fundamentally
unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own
case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprize concerning the refutation of the very pieces of evidence
which he disclosed to the State." 5"'
Because of its lack of reciprocity, aggravated by a strong
potential for abuse, the rule as it currently stands violates due
process.
III. ENSURING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
UNDER THE, RULE
A. FirTH A ENDMENT PROTECTION
Since certain applications of the Minnesota rule providing
for discovery of documents and reports may be both incriminating and compelled, the rule must be narrowed so as to exclude
discovery of any such items that are also testimonial. Discovery
must not be permitted where the documents or reports were preits, and if arrested his person may be searched. He may also
be compelled to participate in various nontestimonial identification procedures. The prosecutor may force third persons to cooperate through the use of grand juries and may issue subpoenas
requiring appearance before prosecutorial investigatory boards.
With probable cause the police may search private areas and
seize evidence and may tap telephone conversations. They may
use undercover agents and have access to vast amounts of information in government files. Finally, respect for government authority will cause many people to cooperate with the police or
prosecutor voluntarily when they might not cooperate with the
defendant.
Id. at 475-76 n.9 (quoting Note, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed
Rule 16, 85 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1018-1019 (1972)).
54. Mumn. R. Cam. P. 9.01(3) (2).
"55. Id. 9.03 (5).
56. Indeed, the prosecutor might b a remiss in not certifying on the
basis of any plausible suspicion, for witnesses can be encouraged to testify candidly only if there is some assurance that they will not be threatened or injured. See note 8 supra.
57. 412 U.S. at 476.
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pared with the assistance of or participation by the accused. Even
so narrowed, however, the rule would still violate the fifth
amendment unless the prosecution's use of disclosed information
were limited to cross-examination and, if the defendant introduces the disclosed evidence at trial, to rebuttal. Although to so
limit the prosecution may be exceedingly difficult, one means of
doing so is suggested by the approach taken by the majority in
Kastigar v. United States.58 There the Supreme Court concluded

that use and derivative-use immunity is co-extensive with the
fifth amendment privilege because it leaves "the witness and the
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed his privilege," if the government is required
to carry "the heavy burden of proving that all the evidence it
proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent
sources. ' 9 A minority of the Justices dissented on the ground
that, although theoretically consistent with the privilege, use and
derivative-use immunity is too susceptible to abuse by the government to ensure preservation of the privilege.6 0
'It may be argued that imposing on the prosecution a similar
burden of showing that it did not impermissibly use the benefits
of discovery at trial would adequately protect the defendant's
58. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Kastigar concerned the validity of a federal
immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). The statute authorizes a district court to order a witness to testify over a claim of fifth amendment
privilege but provides that

no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or

any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in
any criminal case ....
By supplanting the fifth amendment privilege with immunity statutes,
legislatures have attempted to relieve the tension between the government's need for information and the personal interests protected by the
privilege. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-47 (1972). See
also Note, Kastigar v. United States: The Required Scope of Immunity
58 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1972); Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity
Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72
YALE L.J.

1568, 1571-74 (1963).
59. 406 U.S. at 461-62.

60. Id. at 466-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 469-71 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that although the use and de-

rivative-use ban is theoretically co-extensive with the fifth amendment,
in practice such a ban would be inadequate to ensure that the government's case is based on evidence derived from a legitimate independent
source. Id. at 468. It would prove inadequate, he asserted, because of
"the inevitable uncertainties of the fact-finding process," id., and because "the information relevant to the question of taint is uniquely
within the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities" so that they would

often be able to carry their burden by the mere assertion that the ban
had been honored. Id.
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fifth amendment privilege from infringement by prosecutorial
discovery. As a practical matter, however, such a rule would be
as susceptible to abuse as is use and derivative-use immunity. 61
Moreover, even if one accepts the Kastigar majority's view that
abuse is obviated by imposing the burden on the prosecution,
the rule would cause problems. If the courts are to rigorously
test the prosecution's claim of permissible use, the task of tracing the sources of the prosecution's evidence in order to determine whether they are "legitimate and independent" may be
extremely difficult. Indeed, it is possible that strict imposition
of the burden would deprive the prosecution of evidence validly
acquired.
Recognizing the problems that inhere in imposing the burden of proof on the prosecution, although disagreeing as to
whether the brunt of the difficulty falls on the defendant or the
prosecution, the lower federal courts applying Kastigar have
developed three devices for simplifying the determination of
whether the burden has been met. It is worthwhile examining
these tests in order to determine whether any of them could be
used to ensure that information discovered from the defendant
under the new rule was not used in the prosecution's case-inchief or, if not used at trial by the defendant, in rebuttal of the
defense.
One standard creates, in effect, an irrebuttable presumption
that the evidence used at trial by the prosecution is tainted if
the prosecution has pretrial knowledge of the defendant's prior,
immunized testimony. 62 Obviously, this standard provides no
assistance here inasmuch as prosecutorial discovery and an irre61.

See note 60 supra.

62. In United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973),
vacating 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992 (1972),
the United States Attorney received a transcript of the defendant's earlier
compelled testimony given under transactional immunity granted by
North Dakota law. See N.D. CENT. CoDE § 16-20-10 (1971).
Although the Government was able to show an independent source
for the evidence introduced at defendant's trial, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the Government failed to meet
the burden imposed by Kastigar. "Such [impermissible] use could conceivably include assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding to
initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence,
planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning trial strategy." 482 F.2d at 311. Thus the prosecution's knowledge of the defendant's prior immunized testimony created, in effect, an irrebuttable presumption of taint due to its "immeasurable subjective effect" on the
prosecution. Id. at 312. Cf. United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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buttable presumption of impermissible use are incompatible.
The prosecution must have access to the disclosed information
to benefit from prosecutorial discovery.
The second standard creates a presumption of misuse but
allows the prosecution to rebut that presumption by showing
that the evidence used at trial was certified against the accused
before he testified under the grant of immunity. 63 A similar
procedure could be implemented with respect to prosecutorial
discovery by requiring the prosecution to certify its evidence
against the defendant before participating in discovery. This
method would be the most certain to ensure that the prosecution does not use discovered information to prove its case-inchief or, if the defendant does not introduce the disclosed evidence at trial, to rebut the defense. However, certification might
unjustifiably impede the prosecution. If, after discovery, the
government independently found evidence other than that disclosed by discovery, the certification requirement would bar its
use at trial. Certification would in that instance impair the
search for truth that the discovery rule is intended to promote.
The third standard applied in federal courts interpreting
Kastigar allows the prosecutor in charge of a case to swear that
neither he nor his assistants impermissibly used the immunized
testimony.6 4 Similarly, under the new rule, the prosecutor
could swear that he did not impermissibly use the discovered
information. Perhaps the prosecutor's awareness of the penalty
for perjury and of the dangers of suspension and disbarment
would ensure his honesty. But it would seem incongruous if
the person prosecuting the defendant could discharge without
more than his sworn statement the burden of showing that he
did not impermissibly use the benefits of discovery. "If those
who enforced the law could be trusted, there would be no need
for the Bill of Rights, let alone the Fifth Amendment." 5 Constitutional protection must rely on more than good faith. 6
63. This technique was used by Archibald Cox in the Government's
case against John Dean. Kapeau & Zimmett, The Federal Use Immunity
Statute Since Kastigar, 1973/74 ANw. Sun. or Am.L. 343, 359. See also
Comment, Kastigar v. United States: The Required Scope of Immunity,
58 VA. L. REv.1099 (1972).
64. See, e.g., United States v. First Western State Bank, 491
F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 1974) ("If the prosecuting sovereign has made
its independent investigation and can show nonuse of the immunized
testimony,. . . by... direct statements made in good faith that it did
not use the immunized testimony, it should have a clear right to proceed
with its own prosecution.").
65.

L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 187 (1975).

66. In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (D.Conn. 1972).
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There does not, then, appear to be an entirely satisfactory
method of ensuring that the prosecution will not use the fruits
of discovery to prove its case-in-chief or to impermissibly rebut
the defendant's case when the defendant has not introduced the
disclosed evidence at trial. Furthermore, there is no justification
for an assumption that these impermissible uses of disclosed information will not occur under the new rule. And if courts are
unwilling to either declare prosecutorial discovery unconstitutional or adopt a certification device in order to preserve its constitutionality, they should at least remain vigilant lest, by assuming the prosecution's evidence is untainted, they inadvertently
impose upon the defendant the burden of proving that it is. As
the Supreme Court stated in Malloy v. Hogan 7 and assumed in
Kastigar, requiring the defendant to prove that his disclosure
constituted a criminal hazard "would be . .. [to, compel him] to
surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to
guarantee."0 81 This result would be particularly lamentable in
view of the fact that the burden would be a very difficult one
for the defendant to carry, for he has no means of ascertaining
whether and how the prosecution used the information he disclosed.
B.

DuE PROCESS

It is far easier to suggest the solution to the due process
infirmities of the discovery rule. The rule appears unconstitutional on its face because the prosecution is allowed to certify
that disclosure of the identity of his witnesses would subject
them to physical harm or coercion while the defendant must
show cause to avoid such disclosure.0 9 To ensure that the rule'
complies with the reciprocity requirement of Wardius, one standard should govern both parties. Because the certification procedure contains great potential for abuse, each side should be
required to show cause in order to obtain a protective order
allowing it to refuse pretrial disclosure. This is the provision
that was adopted by the Supreme Court in the Proposed Feder70
al Rules of Criminal Procedure.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new Minnesota rule allowing pretrial discovery by the
prosecution can easily be brought into conformity with the re67. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
68. Id. at 11.

69. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.

70. Proposed P.R. Crim. P. 16(d) (1), 62 F.R.D. 271, 307 (1974).
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quirements of due process. It need only be made reciprocal in
all respects. It is far less certain whether prosecutorial discovery can coexist with the fifth amendment privilege. Before
adoption of the prosecutorial discovery provision, our accusatorial system of justice "required the government 'to shoulder the
entire load.' ,1 The system demanded "that the government
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel,
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.172 The

new discovery rule, however, compels the defendant to disclose
substantive features of his case and enables the prosecution to
use the fruits of discovery to prove its case-in-chief and to rebut
the defendant's case even if the defendant did not employ the
disclosed information. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has,
therefore, but two alternatives. It can either declare the rule
unconstitutional, or confront directly the difficult problem of ensuring that-on a case-by-case basis-prosecutors confine their
use of discovered information to cross-examination and, if the
defendant discloses the information at trial, to rebuttal.

71. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
72. Id.

